THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY’S ROLE IN NIGERIA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

This paper explores how the 9th National Assembly (2019-2023) contributed to Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts, focusing on both legislative oversight and legislative complicity. While the Constitution designates the legislature as a key accountability body, public discussions indicate that its actions during this period revealed considerable shortcomings in oversight, prompting doubts about its efficiency and independence. Employing a qualitative documentary research approach, this study analyzes secondary data from Auditor-General Reports, NEITI audit findings, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) hearings, civil society publications, and legislative records. These materials were chosen for their credibility, relevance, and ability to be verified. The Principal–Agent Theory serves as the analytical framework, enabling an evaluation of legislative performance through indicators of control (oversight), shirking (weak enforcement), or collusion (complicity). Findings reveal that the legislature frequently exhibited selective oversight, inconsistent follow-up on investigations, inadequate enforcement of committee resolutions, and hesitance to penalize executive agencies with documented corruption. Key anti-corruption legislation remained blocked, while many investigative hearings yielded no significant institutional results. The analysis indicates that political alignment, patronage networks, and executive dominance heavily hindered legislative independence. The study concludes that the 9th National Assembly showed more signs of complicity than effective oversight. It advises enhancing institutional independence, enforcing committee resolutions, improving public access to legislative processes, and instituting legal protections that diminish political motivations for collusion.